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COMMENTS
A Market Approach to Managing Solid
and Hazardous Waste: Waste
Exchange Clearinghouses in the
United States and the European
Community
I. INTRODUCTION
The current problem of solid and hazardous waste' manage-
ment is a graphic example of the failure of the market economy.2
Every year, millions of tons of solid and hazardous waste generated
in Western Europe3 and the United States 4 are buried, rather than
1. The United States Congress defined hazardous waste as a solid waste (any garbage,
sludge or other waste material not excluded by statute) which exhibits any of the following
characteristics: ignitability, corrosivity, reactivity or toxicity. Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 6903(5) (1982). This definition has been the source of
much debate within and outside of the Environmental Protection Agency. The simple defi-
nition of what is and what is not hazardous waste means a great deal of time, money and
effort to generators, handlers, transporters and recyclers of the designated material. See
Senkan & Stauffer, What To Do with Hazardous Waste, 84 TECH. REV. 34, 40-41 (Nov./Dec.
1981).
2. "A market economy is an economic system where the decisions concerning produc-
tion, distribution, and consumption are taken by individual consumers and producers with
no government interferences. The more of this decision-making the government reserves for
itself, the more 'managed' or 'regulated' such an economy becomes." K. HARDACH, THE
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF GERMANY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 211 (1976). "[B]y market
failure . . . at least in allocation theory, we mean the failure of a more or less idealized
system of price-market institutions to sustain 'desirable' activities or to stop 'undesirable'
activities. The desirability of an activity, in turn, is evaluated relative to the solution values
of some explicit or implied maximum-welfare program." Bator, The Anatomy of Market
Failure, reprinted in MICROECONOMICS: SELECTED READINGS 425, 426 (Mansfield 3d ed.
1979).
3. The quantity of waste of every type generated each year in the European Commu-
nity, see infra note 6, is estimated at about 1,700 million tons. This total is composed of 90
million tons of household waste, 115 million tons of industrial waste, 200 million tons of
sewage sludge, 950 million tons of agricultural wastes, and 300 million tons of extractive
industry waste. It is also estimated that there is a five percent annual accumulation rate of
waste in the EC. 20 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 130) 1, 31 (1977).
4. Every year, the United States generates over 350 million metric tons of industrial
waste, of which 50 to 60 million tons are considered hazardous to the public health and
environment, 130 million metric tons of municipal waste, 5 million metric tons of sewage
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recovered.5
This Comment examines the feasibility of a market solution to
the solid and hazardous waste disposal problem by analyzing the
present and potential role of the waste exchange clearinghouse in
waste management. It will also compare and contrast the positions
of the European Community (EC)6 and the United States 7 regarding
sludge, 430 million tons of agricultural waste, and over 3 billion tons of mining waste.
UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: AGENDA
FOR THE 1980's 7 (1982) [hereinafter cited as U.S. GAO). However, according to the United
States Congress' Office of Technology Assessment, about 255 million to 275 million metric
tons of hazardous waste alone are generated annually in the United States. OFFICE OF
TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, UNITED STATES CONGRESS, TECHNOLOGIES AND MANAGE-
MENT STRATEGIES FOR HAZARDOUS WASTE CONTROL 8 (1983). The EPA estimates that the
growth rate of waste is 3.5% per year. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, HAZARDOUS
WASTE INFORMATION 2 (3d ed. 1980). "[Mlillions of tons of recoverable material which
could be used are needlessly buried each year." 42 U.S.C. § 6901. "Although technology
exists to recycle, destroy, neutralize or otherwise treat hazardous waste, California waste
generators continue to be too expensive. . . . But, in comparison to Western Europe, alter-
native treatment technology has lagged in the United States." See Alternatives to Dumps
Considered Too Expensivefor Widespread Use, L.A. Times, Nov. 25, 1984, part I, at 33, col. I
(discusses the economic, legal and social impediments to alternative waste disposal
technology).
5. In general, the full extent of tipping (i.e., dumping), which currently accounts for
70% to 80% of all waste, represents a loss of materials because these materials could be
reused economically, quite apart from environmental problems to which it may give rise. 20
O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 112) 1, 31 (1977). "EPA estimates that about eight percent of the
municipal waste was being recovered in 1977-which was composed of seven percent by
source separation at the the point of generation and one percent by mixed waste processing
or energy recovery." U.S. GAO, supra note 4, at 7. Several Western European countries
process 20% to 60% of their municipal solid waste for energy recovery. 10 ENV'T REP.
(BNA) (Curr. Dev.) 1661 (1979). For the purposes of this Comment, resource recovery
means the recovery of material or energy from solid waste. Recycling is the process whereby
solid and hazardous waste are made reusable or transformed into new products or useable
raw materials.
6. The European Economic Community (EEC) is presently composed of France, the
Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Belgium and
Denmark. The EEC is part of a larger body called the European Community, which com-
bines the EEC, the European Coal and Steel Community (ESCS), and the European Atomic
Energy Community (Euratom). The EEC, as the cornerstone of the European Community,
provides the general governing structure for the Community. Each country has an allotted
number of delegates to the Community Assembly according to its size and population. The
European Community Commission and Council act as the policy-making arms of this inter-
national organization. The Commission and Council have broad and substantial legislative
and executive power. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, 25 March
1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 3, reprinted in W. BURHENNE, ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS OF THE EURO-
PEAN COMMUNITY 20-101 (1976-1981).
7. Emphasis will be upon the RCRA of 1976, the seminal legislation regarding waste
management and the actions of the EPA concerning waste management. In addition, sev-
eral states have waste exchange programs in operation which will be analyzed.
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waste exchanges.
The analysis will begin in Part II by discussing the EC's and the
United States' general legislative foundations for waste exchange
and recycling. Emphasis will be placed upon the goals and princi-
ples for better waste management found in the European Council
Declaration on the Programme of Action of the European Commu-
nities on the Environment of 19738 (the 1973 Programme), its 19779
and 1982' 0 appendices, and the United States Resource Conserva-
tion and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA)." Part III will discuss the
various strategies and tactics that the EC and the United States En-
vironmental Protection Agency (EPA) have taken to create market
opportunities for waste exchanges. This section will also compare
the relationship between the national and international governing
bodies, the EPA and EC, and member states (particularly California
and West Germany) regarding waste exchanges. The final section
will synthesize the points raised in the preceding sections in order to
develop an understanding of the interrelationship of markets, gov-
ernment, industry, the public, and market facilitators in the solid
and hazardous waste and resource management context.
A. Market Economics and Waste Pollution
The burgeoning hazardous and solid waste disposal problem
can be attributed to the fact that today's industrialized market econ-
omies are not the same as Adam Smith's ideal market economy.12
Ideally, the market economy is guided by an "invisible hand," caus-
ing every producer of goods and services to promote an end which is
not necessarily intended by him. 13 Thus, while each producer is
seeking his own economic goals, producers incidentally promote so-
8. 16 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 112) 1 (1973).
9. 20 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 139) 1 (1977).
10. 26 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 46) 1 (1983).
Ii. 42 U.S.C. § 6903.
12. Kneese, Natural Resources Policy 1975-1985, 3 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 253, 256
(1976).
13. 1 A. SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS 456 (Glasgow ed. 1976).
By preferring the support of domestick to that of foreign industry, he intends only
his own security; and by directing that industry in such a manner as its produce
may be of the greatest value, he intends only his own gain, and he is in this, as in
many other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of
his intention. Nor is it always the worse for the society that it was no part of it. By
pursuing his own interest he frequently promotes that of the society more effectu-
ally than when he really intends to promote it.
1984]
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cietal interests more effectively than when they purposefully pro-
mote those societal goals through the interaction of competing self-
interests. 14 If an ideal market economy existed, industries would
discover that the economic incentives not to pollute, developed by
competitive markets, outweigh the benefits of pollution. Present
market economies fail to achieve the ideal market, because they do
not meet the following structural requirements:
(1) all markets must be competitive; 15
(2) all market participants must be fully informed; 16 and
(3) all valuable assets in the economy can be individually
owned and managed without violating the first
requirement. 17
Stated another way, industries that create air, water and solid
waste pollution create external diseconomies of production", that
prevent the market economy from attaining Pareto optimality. 19 The
14. Id
15. Perfect competition means that no specific firm or individual can influence market
prices significantly by decreasing or increasing the supply of goods and services offered by
that specific economic unit. Kneese, supra note 12, at 255. See generally E. MANSFIELD,
ECONOMICS: PRINCIPLES, PROBLEMS, DECISIONS (2d ed. 1977).
16. Market participants, suppliers and consumers of goods and services should be fully
informed as to the quantitative and qualitative characteristics of goods and services and the
terms of exchange among them. Kneese, supra note 12, at 255.
17. These assets include common property resources such as air, water and ecological
systems. Id This concept of private ownership of common property resources is a novel
idea, best exemplified by the Maryland Economic & Community Development Depart-
ment's proposal for a statewide program for banking and marketing air pollution rights.
The proposal would allow an industry or company with low pollution levels to store air
quality credits, which it could later sell, trade or use for itself. A Bankfor Marketing the
Right to Pollute, Bus. WK., Aug. 18, 1980, at 29. See generally Krupnick, Oates & Van De
Verg, On Marketable Air-Pollution Permits. The Casefor a System ofPollution Offsets, 10 J.
ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 233 (1983) (discusses the capacity of a pollution-offset system,
based upon marketing of emission permits, to achieve air quality standards at minimum
fiscal and administrative costs).
18. An external diseconomy of production is an economic situation which occurs when
an action results in uncompensated costs to others. E. MANSFIELD, supra note 15, at 699.
See also id. at 237; Kneese, supra note 12, at 257.
19. Pareto optimality is a situation where all market participants are economically sati-
ated. The market forces of supply and demand have achieved equilibrium by meeting all of
the economic needs of all of the market participants. Therefore, if one person wanted to
increase his economic satisfaction, it would be at the expense of another-upsetting the
equilibrium. A more technical definition of Pareto optimality is:
[A] situation where all possible gains from voluntary exchange of goods and serv-
ices have been exhausted and no participant is willing to make further exchanges at
the terms of trade which have come to exist. . . . When no more beneficial ex-
changes can be made, the economy has reached a situation where each individual
cannot improve his own economic welfare without damaging that of another...
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costs associated with the destructive effects of solid and hazardous
waste20 do not always directly effect the producer/polluter, but they
do place a substantial burden on society as a whole. 21 Because of the
disruptive nature of external diseconomies of production, 22 present
market mechanisms cannot generate economic incentives for the
producer/polluter to protect the environment and cease the indis-
criminate dumping of solid and hazardous waste. 23
B. The Desirability of Waste Exchanges
A waste exchange clearinghouse is an economic and adminis-
trative body that effectuates the quick, economical and convenient
exchange of wastes from industry, agriculture, mining and munici-
palities to recyclers. 24 It maintains a confidential inventory of infor-
mation on industrial wastes that are available from producers and
wastes desired by recyclers. 25 The waste exchange clearinghouse
supplies the three central ingredients needed for a more efficient and
no one can be better off without someone else being worse off, Pareto optimality
has been reached.
Kneese, supra note 12, at 256. See generally E. MANSFIELD, supra note 15; Bator, supra note
2, at 426-27.
20. The return of residuals (waste from industry) to nature can damage the environ-
ment, either because in the process of using original materials man has transformed them
into something harmful (toxic waste) and has concentrated them in unnatural ways, or be-
cause otherwise harmless residuals react chemically with other substances or with each other
in the air or water in a damaging way. A. KNEESE & C. SCHULTZE, POLLUTION, PRICES, AND
PUBLIC POLICY 4 (1977).
21. E. MANSFIELD, supra note 15, at 435-38; Kneese, supra note 12, at 257.
22. E. MANSFIELD, supra note 15, at 699.
23. Kneese, supra note 12, at 257.
24. See Alternative Technology and Policy Development Section, California Depart-
ment of Health Services, California Waste Exchange: A Newsletter/Catalog 3 (Oct. 1982);
Senkan & Stauffer, supra note 1, at 39. There are many examples of market exchanges that
operate in today's market economy. The New York Stock Exchange facilitates the purchase,
sale and trading of corporate securities. See generally R. SOBEL, THE BIG BOARD: A HIS-
TORY OF THE NEW YORK STOCK MARKET (1965); B. WHEELER, NEW YORK STOCK Ex-
CHANGE FACT BOOK 1982 (1982). The Chicago Board of Trade provides a similar service
for the bulk sale and purchase of food and raw materials. See generally CHICAGO BOARD OF
TRADE, THE FUTURES MARKET: WHAT, How, WHO, WHY (1978); Chicago Board of Trade
of the City of Chicago, 38(2) ANNALS 189 (Sept. 1911). Sunkist Growers, Inc. is an agricul-
tural cooperative that acts as a marketing exchange to organize and facilitate the sale,
purchase and processing of its members' citrus fruit. See generally C. KIRKMAN, UNITED
STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, THE SUNKIST ADVENTURE (1975). All of these
price market institutions bring widespread market participants with varying needs and
wants together in a centralized marketplace to effectuate the dynamic functioning of a par-
ticularized market, which would otherwise be less disciplined and productive.
25. See, e.g., Alternative Technology and Policy Development Section, supra note 24,
at 3-4.
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rational market economy,26 while concurrently rectifying its failure
to control waste pollution. The waste exchange also strengthens the
market's capacity to manage waste disposal by changing the struc-
ture of market economy incentives, improving competition, and re-
ducing the level of direct government regulation.27
By facilitating the exchange of waste between the producer and
the recycler, the waste exchange clearinghouse creates and enhances
economic incentives for both parties. The waste exchange clearing-
house fosters a supplier-consumer relationship between the pro-
ducer of waste and the recycler of waste through the following
incentives:
(1) reduction of a producer's dependence on foreign imports of
natural resources by the greater recovery of materials;28
(2) savings in disposal costs to the producer through increased
recycling efforts;29
(3) savings in energy costs to the producer through the re-
cycling effort; 30
(4) savings to the recipient of recycled or recovered material,
which is generally less expensive than virgin material;3' and
(5) increased business for the recycling industry through the
heightened awareness of a market for wastes of all types by
the waste producers. 32
All of these incentives share the common element of cost or
monetary value regarding the choice of one course of action over
26. An effective, rational market economy consists of perfect competition between mar-
ket participants who are fully informed as to the quantitative and qualitative aspects of
goods and services. A rational market economy would also be one where common property
resources like air and water could be individually owned and managed. Kneese, supra note
12, at 255.
27. Id. at 259. See generally O'Neill, Direct Empirical Estimation of Efficiency in Secon-
dary Materials Markets." The Case of Steel Scrap, 10 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 270 (1983)
(discusses the effect of an organized futures exchange market on recycled commodity mar-
kets and market efficiency in general).
28. 42 U.S.C. § 6901; 18 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 168) 2 (1975); 17 O.J. EUR. COMM.
(No. C 142) 6 (1974).
29. Alternative Technology and Policy Development Section, supra note 24, at 3-4.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. For example, the demand for waste paper is expected to increase over the next ten
to twenty years because of demand for waste paper created by foreign recycling firms and
the increased number of solid waste to energy resource recovery plants in the United States.
12 ENV'T REP. (BNA) (Curr. Dev.) 1496 (Dec. 31, 1981).
[Vol. 7:27
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another.33 These alternative cost incentives communicate to the pol-
luting enterprises that greater economic benefits accrue with re-
cycling. Additionally, the waste exchange's inventory of
information keeps waste market participants fully informed of both
the quantity and nature of waste, and the terms of exchange (includ-
ing price, transportation and delivery).34
The waste exchange clearinghouse also improves competition
among waste recyclers by creating a more favorable market for
waste recycling. With greater opportunities to make a profit in
waste recycling, more entrepreneurs as well as established enter-
prises will enter the recycling industry. As market demand for
waste increases to a level equal to the market supply of waste, the
market economy comes closer to Pareto optimality with respect to
waste management.
Finally, the waste exchange clearinghouse solves the waste dis-
posal problem by enhancing market efficiency instead of replacing
the market with bureaucratic government decision-making.
Although the waste exchange clearinghouse will not completely
eliminate the need for government regulation, it will reduce the di-
rect role of government regulation in waste management.
By expediting the transfer of waste from producers to recyclers,
the waste exchange clearinghouse generates market incentives that
lead to the reduction of both wastes going to landfills 35 and the con-
sequential risk to human health and the environment. Thus, the
waste exchange attempts to fuse profit-minded interests of waste
producers and recyclers with societal goals in a manner not unlike
Adam Smith's "invisible hand."
II. LEGISLATIVE FOUNDATIONS OF THE WASTE EXCHANGE
A. Recognition of the Problem of Waste Disposal
In order to reduce or eradicate the threat that solid and hazard-
ous wastes pose to the public health and the environment, govern-
ment, industry and the general public must recognize the magnitude
and urgency of the problem. How this problem is expressed directly
influences the type and extent of action governments and industries
take to solve the problem.
33. J. GWARTNEY, ECONOMICS: PRIVATE AND PUBLIC CHOICE 16 (1976).
34. Kneese, supra note 12, at 257-58.
35. Alternative Technology and Policy Development Section, supra note 24, at 3.
1984]
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1. European Community
In 1973, the EC established its first Programme of Action on
the Environment.36 The 1973 Programme was based on the notion
that the elimination of industrial and consumer wastes was posing
an increasingly difficult, costly and complex problem for municipal
authorities. 37 The EC also regarded certain industrial and toxic
wastes as an important problem because of their toxicity and non-
degradability.38 The EC then augmented its initial position on toxic
wastes in 1976 when it stated that the "essential objective of all pro-
visions relating to toxic and dangerous waste disposal must be the
protection of human health and the safeguarding of the environ-
ment against harmful effects caused by the collection of toxic and
dangerous waste as well as its storage and tipping [i.e., dumping]." 39
2. United States
In 1976, the United States Congress passed the Resource Con-
servation and Recovery Act, which viewed the waste disposal prob-
lem as the consequence of advanced technological manufacturing,
continued economic and population increases, and concentrated ur-
ban conditions. o Congress found these developments created "seri-
ous financial, management, intergovernmental, and technical
problems in the disposal of solid wastes .... ,,41 Congress also rec-
ognized the inadequacy of existing federal environmental laws in
preventing unsound disposal of solid and hazardous waste.42 Fur-
thermore, Congress determined that hazardous waste presented spe-
cial dangers to health beyond those associated with non-hazardous
waste.43 Most significantly, Congress regarded hazardous waste as
an area that "requires a greater degree of regulation .. .,4
B. Goals and Principles of Waste Management
Following the recognition of the problem, the EC and the
36. 16 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 112) 1, 28 (1973).
37. Id
38. Id
39. 19 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 194) 2 (1976) (Proposal for a Council Directive on
Toxic and Dangerous Wastes).
40. 42 U.S.C. § 6901(a)(l)-(3).
41. Id § 6901(a)(3).
42. Id § 6901(b)(3).
43. Id § 6901(b)(5).
44. Id
Vol. 7:27
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United States have taken positions on possible solutions to the solid
and hazardous waste problem. Both agree that the problem extends
beyond regional boundaries and is a matter that requires interna-
tional, as well as national, action.45 The EC and the United States,
however, differ slightly in their respective philosophical approaches
to the problem.
1. European Community
The EC's environmental program is predicated upon promot-
ing throughout "the Community a harmonious development of eco-
nomic activities, a continuous and balanced expansion, an increase
in stability, an accelerated raising of the standard of living and
closer relations between the States belonging to it."46 This guiding
organizational ethic is incorporated in the EC's goals regarding
waste disposal. The EC believes that the ideal environmental
policy:
consists in preventing the creation of pollution or nuisances at
source, rather than subsequently trying to counteract their effects.
To this end, technical progress must be conceived and devised so
as to take into account the concern for protection of the environ-
ment and for the improvement of the quality of life at the lowest
cost to the community. This environment policy can and must be
compatible with economic and social development. This also ap-
plies to technical progress.47
Thus, the EC centers its environmental programs on several govern-
mental, economic and social principles. Fundamentally, the EC
seeks to tailor its governmental and economic action to the type of
pollution and geographical area involved. 48 As a consequence, if an
environmental program is best administered at a particular govern-
mental level, it will remain there without risk of preemption by
competing or higher levels of government.
The EC environmental program coordinates the major aspects
of environmental policy in individual countries to end the isolated
planning and implementation of these policies, because national
45. The elimination of wastes in the EC "require[s] a solution extending beyond the
regional framework and possibly even beyond national frontiers." 16 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No.
C 112) 1, 28 (1973). Waste disposal has "become a matter national in scope and in concern
and necessitate[s] federal action ...." 42 U.S.C. § 6901(a)(4).
46. Treaty on the European Economic Community, supra note 6, art. 2.
47. 16 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 112) i, 6, para. 1 (1973).
48. Id at 7, para. 10; 26 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 46) 1, 4, para. 6 (1983).
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programs in these fields (air, water, noise, waste and nuclear) should
be harmonized within the Community.49 According to this principle,
the EC orchestrates the disparate environmental programs of the
Member States into a balanced and united governmental front
against all kinds of pollution. The EC is also careful to harmonize
only the "major aspects" of the Member States' environmental pol-
icy, thus allowing the Member States to fit the EC environmental
programs to their respective needs and achieve "actual progress at
the national level."'50
A primary concern and objective of the EC environmental
plan, however, is to harmonize national environmental policies
without compromising the "satisfactory operation of the common
market." 5' The EC plans to reconcile the often divergent goals of
environmental protection and economic efficiency by recognizing
that economic growth should not be viewed from a purely quantita-
tive perspective. 52 Moreover, the 1982 Programme was designed in
recognition of the "socio-economic context of the 1980's," which
dictates that environmental regulation seriously consider "employ-
ment, inflation, energy, balance of payments and growing regional
disparities. . . . 53This explicit linkage of environmental policy to
economic policy is a unique characteristic of the EC.
In terms of social policy, the EC plans to organize a continuous
and detailed educational program at all levels to sharpen the aware-
ness of environmental problems.5 4 With the general public's increas-
ing awareness of environmental issues, the EC hopes to foster a
society more responsive to environmental protection for present and
future generations.55 An additional goal of this program is to create
an international political consensus about pollution control and
prevention.
Finally, the EC environmental program seeks to implement an
environment information procedure and network to keep Member
States and industry current on developments in environmental pro-
tection, technology, enforcement and legislation. 56 This information
49. 16 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 112) 1, 7, para. 11 (1973).
50. Id
51. Id
52. Id
53. 26 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 46) 1, 4, para. 6 (1983).
54. 16 O.J. EuR. COMM. (NO. C 112) 1, 7, para. 11 (1973).
55. Id
56. Id
[Vol. 7:27
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network is also intended to avoid individual national measures ad-
versely affecting the proper functioning of the common market or
otherwise making the EC programs difficult to implement.57 Fur-
thermore, the free interchange of ideas, processes, solutions, ques-
tions and warnings is the keystone to a socio-economic structure
that precedes waste exchange clearinghouse development.
2. United States
In addition to coupling waste management with increased en-
ergy conservation and alternative energy source development, 58
Congress has promulgated the following economic and environmen-
tal goals:
(1) Encourage development and use of technological alternatives
to land disposal, such as waste reduction and treatment, to
reduce risks resulting from releases of hazardous waste con-
stituents into the environment;
(2) Improve and expand data and information on hazardous
wastes, facilities, and health and environmental effects which
are necessary for. . . implementation of RCRA. . .by both
the EPA and the States;
(3) Improve and expand participation in RCRA ... by the
States through improved definition, implementation, and
support of both Federal and State responsibilities;
(4) Reduce risks transferred to the future, whether several years
or to future generations, and reduce costs of waste manage-
ment which are externalized and shifted to society in
general. 59
This program envisions the eventual transfer of the administration
of these waste management programs to the states.60 A problem has
arisen, however, between the RCRA program and the states "at a
critical time when the program is just beginning to be fully imple-
mented, [because] some States believe that there are substantial im-
pediments to providing adequate protection to the public."61 In fact,
some states refused to take responsibility over the administration of
57. 26 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 46) 1 (1983).
58. 42 U.S.C. § 6901(c)(1)-(3), (d)(1)-(3).
59. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, UNITED STATES CONGRESS, TECHNOLO-
GIES AND MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES FOR HAzARDous WASTE CONTROL: SUMMARY 36-37
(1983) [hereinafter cited as OTA REPORT].
60. Id at 33.
61. Id
19841
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RCRA.62
One of the states' major complaints is that they are not receiv-
ing adequate financial assistance from the federal government to
implement increased responsibilities under RCRA.63 The sparse
funding and uncertainty of RCRA regulations deprives the states
and municipalities of a sufficient technical information base about
wastes, storage, handling, treatment and disposal, and sufficient
technical personnel to carry out the regulations. 64
RCRA's commitment to a federal-state partnership concerning
waste management 65 is a hollow one. Many states feel that they are
"not given sufficient opportunities to influence the formulation of
federal regulations," especially when states are called upon to be the
main implementers of policy. 66 Complaints have also emphasized
that regional programs involving several states, counties or cities to
fight indiscriminate waste dumping are not supported by the federal
government and are difficult to organize. 67 Finally, states complain
they are not given sufficient latitude by the EPA to develop their
own programs designed to achieve the same ends as federal pro-
grams but through different means.68
Thus, while there is an apparent similarity in the goals and
principles of the EC and the United States, there is a subtle but
telling difference in the formulation and effect of environmental
62. Id
63. Id See also Interview with Chris Arnold, Senior Staff Analyst, Orange County Ad-
ministrative Office, in Santa Ana, Calif. (Feb. 1, 1984). Commenting on President Reagan's
1984 State of the Union address, Arnold said that she hoped that some of the planned budg-
etary increase for the EPA would "trickle down" to the municipal level. See generally
Schnapf, State Hazardous Waste Programs under the Federal Resource Conservation and Re-
covery Act, 12 ENVTL. L. 679 (1982).
64. OTA REPORT, supra note 59, at 33; Interview with Chris Arnold, supra note 63.
Arnold explained that a minor crisis arose over the disposal of a certain sixty gallon barrel of
chemicals. None of the county agencies, from the Fire Department to the local Sanitation
District, knew what to do or how to identify the chemical waste.
65. 42 U.S.C. § 6902(8). "Recognizing that states are the implementing arm of the fed-
eral hazardous waste management program, EPA Administrator William Ruckleshaus said
.. . that 'we need the states as our partners on the front line in the battle against hazardous
wastes.!" However, only 30 states are projected to receive final authorization of their pro-
grams by the January, 1985 deadline. Reversion of many state programs to the EPA will
cause a "significant disruption to the regulated community." 14 ENV'T REP. (BNA) (Curr.
Dev.) 1141 (Oct. 28, 1983).
66. OTA REPORT, supra note 59, at 34.
67. Id
68. Id For instance, California's toxic waste disposal rules are tougher than respective
federal laws. L.A. Times, May 2, 1984, part I, at 3, col. 5.
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principles. The EC stresses flexible administrative designs that co-
ordinate and harmonize individual Member State policies toward
common environmental goals without stripping Member States of
their essential individuality. The EC also undertakes the ambitious
task of trying to incorporate environmental objectives into its eco-
nomic analyses and programs. The United States, on the other
hand, takes a more pragmatic approach to environmental problems,
relying upon obdurate federal regulations,69 which belies the high
economic costs and administrative conflict of federal and state waste
management policies.
70
III. CREATION OF A WASTE EXCHANGE ENVIRONMENT
A. Introduction
This section examines the strategies and tactics of the EC and
the United States which directly and/or indirectly affect the forma-
tion of waste exchanges. Further, it studies the effect of government
fiscal measures on waste exchange development. Finally, this sec-
tion analyzes actual waste exchange operations in the EC and the
United States. Each area of analysis will be examined in light of the
following issues:
(1) Whether the subject strategy or specific action strengthens
the market's capacity to manage solid and hazardous waste by
changing the structure of market economy incentives;
(2) Whether the subject strategy or specific action increases the
market's ability to handle waste disposal by improving competition
among market participants; and
(3) Whether governmental action helps the market to solve its
waste disposal problem.7'
Although waste exchanges will not single-handedly solve the
waste disposal problem, 72 they can be an integral, even pivotal, part
69. 42 U.S.C. § 6901(b)(5).
70. See Schnapf, supra note 63, at 703-17; Florini, Issues ofFederalism in Hazardous
Waste Control Cooperation or Confusion, 6 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 307 (1982); OTA RE-
PORT, supra note 59, at 48-49 (planning of greater integration of environmental protection
programs); and Halgren, Recycling and Resource Recovery.- State and Municipal Legal Im-
pediments, 7 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1 (1980).
71. Kneese, supra note 12, at 259.
72. United States Environmental Protection Agency, Waste Clearinghouses and Ex-
changes: A Summary-New Ways/or Identifying and Transferring Reusable Industrial Pro-
cess Waste, EPA 530, SW-130c.I 8 (1977) [hereinafter cited as U.S. EPA] "Although
information clearinghouses can assist industry, their importance should not be overempha-
sized." Id
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of a comprehensive waste management program that emphasizes a
market approach. In order for waste exchanges to develop, a proper
legislative, economic and technical milieu is needed. This kind of
environment correlates recoverable waste streams and manufactur-
ing processes, maximizes the benefits of waste transfer, creates a sta-
ble market for waste exchanges, and provides adequate government
support and regulation.73
B. Waste Management Strategies and Tactics
1. Technical feasibility
One method of making markets more competitive in waste
management is the collection and dissemination of information on
technical advances in waste recovery and recycling, data on recover-
able waste, and reports regarding the replacment of virgin with re-
covered materials. Information of this sort is the basis for cost/
benefit analyses, loan decisions, capital formation questions, recov-
ered waste procurement and waste sales. The more market partici-
pants know about the goods and services available to them, the
more likely they are to use them for their own benefit as well as
society's. Technical feasibility is the correlation of chemical and
physical properties of available and recyclable waste streams and
the specification of raw, virgin materials they might replace.74 The
technical feasibility needed for waste exchange development also in-
cludes the interchange of ancillary information on waste technology,
treatment and recycling.
a. European Community
The 1973 Programme's strategy to counter the multiplying
waste problem and effect governmental integration was to harmo-
nize waste regulations among the Member States, exchange techni-
cal information and create an information pooling system on
wastes-especially information regarding elimination and recycling
methods, and firms specializing in transportation, storage or treat-
ment of wastes.75
The 1982 Programme focuses on the prevention of waste and
other pollution through a variety of means. One of the primary
means is to improve the requisite knowledge and information about
73. See id at 4.
74. Id
75. 16 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 112) 1, 29 (1973).
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environmental hazards and make it readily available to government
decision-makers, private industry and the general public.76 "The
Commission [of the European Community]77 will continue its activ-
ities concerning the dissemination of scientific and technical data on
the protection and improvement of the environment. . and in the
development of a European information market and a production
market of its own." 78 In this regard, the EC already has several envi-
ronmental information programs under study and several in current
operation.
79
Each informational program has a common purpose, which is
to broaden the coordination of environmental research, enforce-
ment, legislation and prevention. This supply of information helps
producers monitor their production levels, plan product develop-
ment, systematize and conserve raw material procurement, and re-
cycle waste. Through this network of information programs and
exchanges, the EC has already taken a step toward perfecting a Eu-
ropean environmental information market.
The 1982 Progamme's major strategy regarding waste manage-
ment is built on several EC Directives. 80 An important element of
both the Directive on Waste and the Directive on Toxic and Dan-
76. 26 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 46) 1, 6 (1983).
77. The Commission of the European Economic Community and for the European
Community is, in general, along with the Council, the governing and policy-making arm of
the EC. The Commission ensures that the Treaty establishing the European Economic Com-
munity applies to all of the institutions derived from the Treaty. The Commission has the
power to decide and participate in the shaping of measures taken by the Council or the
Assembly and also to use the powers given to it by the Council to implement EC programs.
See Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, supra note 6, art. 152-153.
78. 26 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 46) i, 6 (1983).
79. For an index and bibliography to information sources regarding environmental
protection, see 19 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 31) 8 (1976). The International Referral System
is a contribution by the EC to the United Nations Environmental Program. 20 O.J. EUR.
COMM. (No. C 139) 1, 39, para. 226 (1977). The Scientific and Technical Information and
Documentation program concerns environmental measures. 18 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L
100) 18 (1975). For an information system on environmental legislation among the Member
States, also known as the Community Environmental Legislation Exchange (CELEX), see
20 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 139) 1, 39-40 (1977). For a data bank compiling all analyses of
the technology available to combat pollution, especially the best technical means available
to reduce the threat of environmental pollution at minimum cost, see 16 O.J. EUR. COMM.
(No. L 153) 11-12 (1973), which contains a data bank of chemicals likely to contaminate the
environment in conjunction with Ispra Joint Research Centre (JRC). Id
80. Council Directive on Waste, 18 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 194) 39 (1975); Council
Directive on Disposal of Polychlorinated Biphenyls and Polychlorinated Terphenyls (PC B's and
PCT's), 19 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 108) 41 (1976); Council Directive on Waste from the
Titanium Dioxide Industry, 21 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 84) 43 (1978).
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gerous Waste that advances technical feasibility is a waste identifi-
cation or manifest system.81 This identification is invaluable to the
technical feasibility needed for the operation of a waste exchange
clearinghouse. The Directive on Waste mandated that all Member
States implement a waste handling permit program requiring all
waste handlers to disclose the type and quantity of waste to be
treated, general technical requirements, precautions to be taken, and
the origin and destination of the waste. 82
A more specific waste identification program is outlined in the
Directive on Toxic and Dangerous Waste.8 3 Whenever toxic and
dangerous waste is to be transported in the course of its disposal, it
is to be accompanied by the following data:
(1) nature of the waste;
(2) composition of the waste;
(3) volume of mass of the waste;
(4) name and address of the producer(s) or of the previous
holder(s);
(5) name and address of the next holder or of the final dis-
poser; and
(6) location of the site of final disposal where known 4
Additionally, any establishment that produces, stores, disposes or
transfers toxic and dangerous materials is required to maintain: (1) a
record of the quantity, nature, physical and chemical characteristics
and origin of such waste; and (2) the methods and sites used for
disposing of such waste, including the dates of receipt and dispo-
sal.85 The sum of this information will enable a waste exchange to
correlate and direct waste from the generator to the user efficiently,
safely and economically.
The final element of the EC's program to exchange technical
information and create a waste information pooling system is found
in the fifth adaptation to the Council Directive of 27 June 1967 on
the Approximation of the Laws, Regulations and Administrative
Provisions Relating to the Classification, Packaging and Labelling
81. A good definition of "manifest system" is in the RCRA. Generally, a manifest sys-
tem uses a form for identifying the quantity and composition, and the origin, routing and
destination of hazardous waste during transportation from point of generation to point of
disposal, treatment or storage. 42 U.S.C. § 6903(12).
82. 18 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 194) 39, 41 (1975).
83. 21 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 84) 43 (1978).
84. Id at 46.
85. Id
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of Dangerous Substances.8 6 This Directive requires manufacturers
of new dangerous substances to notify the appropriate Member
State authorities 87 by completing an industry-developed "technical
dossier" on the new substance containing all of the information nec-
essary to evaluate "forseeable direct or indirect risks" it might cause
to man and the environment.8 8 These substances are then classified
according to the degree of danger and risk.89 The Commission of the
EC receives copies of this technical dossier and disseminates rele-
vant information to other Member States.90 The Commission of the
EC also keeps a catalogue of these new substances and has the re-
sponsibility of keeping it current.91
The EC also details package labelling requirements for all toxic
and harmful substances. 92 Each package must clearly and indelibly
show:
(1) name(s) of the toxic ingredient(s);
(2) name(s) of harmful ingredient(s) present in a given
concentration;
(3) name(s) and address(es) of the manufacturer;
(4) symbols and indications of the dangerous attendants to the
toxic, harmful or highly flammable preparation; and
(5) a notice of the special risk deriving from these dangers.93
This labelling program helps to prevent industries from dumping
wastes containing materials with toxic substances by informing
users of the material's hazards. Also, knowledge of toxic substances
86. 19 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 260) 4 (1976).
87. Id at 6; Scannel, Chemical Production and the Environment in Certain European
Countries-General Report on the Law ofthe EEC Member States, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
AND CHEMICAL SUBSTANCES: SECOND EUROPEAN SYMPOSIUM ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
17, 20 (H. Steiger ed. 1979).
88. 19 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 260) 4, 6 (1976).
89. Id at 5. There are nine categories of hazardous waste: explosive, oxidizing, easily
inflammable, flammable, toxic, harmful, corrosive, irritant and dangerous for the environ-
ment. Id at 6.
90. Id at 21; see Scannel, supra note 87, at 21.
91. 19 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 260) 4, 6 (1976).
92. Suetens, Regulation ofthe Use ofEnvironmental Chemicals General Report on the
Law of the EEC Member States, in ENVIRONMENTAL'LAW AND CHEMICAL SUBSTANCES:
SECOND SYMPOSIUM ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 119, 121 (H. Steiger ed. 1979).
93. Id This directive was enacted to remove the hindrances to trade among the EC
caused by differences in national provisions of the Member States on the classification, pack-
aging and labelling of dangerous substances. 10 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 196) 1 (1967).
This law was also designed to monitor the introduction of new substances into the market
that may cause environmental damage and to allow Member States to appraise the conse-
quences of these new substances on man. 19 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 260) 4 (1976).
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before manufacturing facilitates waste separation after use, making
the waste more accessible to potential users.
The EC programs depend greatly upon governmental regula-
tion of waste and industry cooperation. The EC and its Member
States are the initiators of these programs, but the result is greater
market opportunities for waste exchanges. In order for market in-
centives to change and competition to blossom in the waste manage-
ment field, a stable market for recovered waste and certain
government help is needed.
b. United States
The United States' general strategy toward waste management
and waste exchange clearinghouses is based upon the following
principle:
Providing technical and financial assistance to state and local
governments and interstate agencies for the development of solid
waste management plans (including resource recovery and re-
source conservation systems) which will promote improved solid
waste management techniques (including more effective organi-
zation arrangements), new and improved methods of collection,
separation, and recovery of solid waste, and the environmentally
safe disposal of nonrecoverable residues.94
Much like the EC environmental programs, the RCRA outlines
various waste management information and guideline programs
that the EPA will institute to form the technical foundation for
waste exchange clearinghouses. These programs include technical
research on alternative waste management practices, the character
of waste streams, and waste inventory systems. 95 Working in con-
junction with several federal, state and local authorities, the EPA is
to coordinate and conduct several research projects.96 The projects
which will have the greatest impact on waste exchange development
are studies on the use of solid waste as fuel, the development and
application of new methods of processing and recovering materials
and energy from solid waste, and the identification of recoverable
materials. 97
Knowing exactly the types of waste and the extent to which
94. 42 U.S.C. § 6902(1).
95. Id §§ 6981-6983.
96. Id. § 698 1(a).
97. Id § 6981(a)(4), (7), (8).
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they exist in certain waste streams is especially important for emer-
gency response, waste treatment and waste recycling. Toward this
end, the EPA is to conduct a systematic analysis of the composition
of solid waste streams, their potential future changes in character,
and their potential uses in productive capacities. 98 The EPA is also
responsible for establishing and maintaining a central reference li-
brary containing all of the studies mentioned above, as well as all
other materials relating to waste management.99 Not only is the
EPA to maintain this compendium of waste management informa-
tion, but it is also required to disseminate this information and all
recent technical, managerial, financial and market information to
interested parties.1t° This information is to be periodically supple-
mented by the EPA's Science Advisory Board (SAB).' 0
Although these RCRA information regulations have achieved
some success, major uncertainties persist regarding how much haz-
ardous waste is generated and the types and capacities of existing
waste management facilities. 102 Not only do these uncertainties con-
ceal the true nature of the United States' waste problems, 0 3 they
also stymie the creation of a technical basis for waste exchange in-
formation. Absent this information, there can be little, if any,
matching between the chemical and physical properties of waste
streams, and the replacement of virgin with recovered materials.
The manifest system is another element of the RCRA which
creates a technical basis for waste exchange. This system is designed
to ensure that all hazardous waste is properly identified by quantity,
composition, origin, routing and destination. 0 4 The manifest re-
mains with the waste from its point of generation, throughout its
98. Id. § 6982(b).
99. Id § 6983(b).
100. Id The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration has developed an elec-
tronic catalog identifying the existence, location, characteristics and availability of environ-
mental data. The agency plans to offer the data base of about 13,000 environmental files and
other services as a public service. 14 ENV'T REP. (BNA) (Curr. Dev.) 1070 (Oct. 21, 1983).
101. 14 ENV'T REP. (BNA) (Curr. Dev.) 1052 (Oct. 21, 1983). The SAB has been asked
by the EPA Administrator to study, inter alia, "the scientific criteria for listing and delisting
hazardous wastes, testing protocols, and characterization of waste defined as hazardous." Id
at 1052-53.
102. OTA REPORT, supra note 59, at 13.
103. Id
104. 42 U.S.C. § 6903(12).
(a) The manifest must contain all of the following information:
(1) a manifest document number;
(2) the generator's name, mailing address, telephone number, and
EPA identification number;
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transportation, and to its final destination (disposal, treatment or
storage). 05 This manifest requirement applies to transporters,
10 6
owners and operators of waste treatment storage, and disposal facili-
ties. 07 There is, however, no specific provision for waste recyclers or
for waste exchange facilities.
By requiring industry to supply pertinent information on haz-
ardous materials, the United States' manifest system has the capac-
ity to function as an all-purpose monitoring system that could
facilitate inspection and enforcement under RCRA, expedite the
safe transportation of wastes, and help organize a rational system of
waste transfer from generators to recyclers/users. However, for the
manifest sytem to be effective, it must have substantial support from
the states and long-term stability. This support has not been forth-
coming. New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania and Delaware all
have objected to an EPA plan for a uniform national manifest sys-
tem. 108 Furthermore, local authorities cite the lack of precise details
in the manifest's required information as a cause of inadequate and
inefficient enforcement of waste disposal laws.109
Both the EC and the United States have recognized the need
for a technical base in order to establish a rational and informed
waste management policy. The EC and the United States have
taken similar actions by instituting information programs, research
projects and manifest systems. One difference is the EC's long-estab-
lished classification, packaging and labelling directive,' 0 which re-
(3) the name and EPA identification number of each transporter;
(4) the name, address, and EPA identification number of the desig-
nated facility and an alternate facility, if any;
(5) the description of the waste(s) (e.g., proper shipping name, etc.)
required by regulations of the U.S. Department of Transporation
in 49 C.F.R. §§ 172.101, 172.202, and 172.203;
(6) the total quantity of each hazardous waste by units of weight or
volume, and the type and number of containers as loaded into or
onto the transport vehicle.
(b) The following certification must appear on the manifest: "This is to cer-
tify that the above named materials are properly classified, described, packaged,
marked and labeled, and are in proper condition for transportation according to
applicable regulations of the Department of Transportation and the EPA."
40 C.F.R. § 263 (1983). Also, California has a manifest system of its own in CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE § 25160 (West 1981).
105. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6903(12), 6922(5).
106. Id § 6923.
107. Id. § 6924.
108. 14 ENV'T REP. (BNA) (Curr. Dev.) 1063 (Oct. 21, 1983).
109. Interview with Chris Arnold, supra note 63.
110. 10 0.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 196) I (1967).
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quires manufacturers of individual and industrial consumer
products to meet product information and warning requirements.
The United States has a comparable law in the Toxic Substances
Control Act (TOSCA)."'1 TOSCA, however, is plagued with the
same problems that have beset the RCRA and its regulations: over-
due and inexact definitions of hazardous waste and its characteris-
tics. 12 According to EPA Administrator William Ruckelshaus, the
Toxic Substances Control Act has worked well, but "the jury is still
out on whether TOSCA is the best way to assure safety of new
substances." '13
2. Marketing and institutional feasibility
Whether the formation of waste exchanges can be facilitated by
the existing socio-economic structure depends a great deal upon the
receptivity, support and strength of markets and market institutions.
Market and institutional feasibility is the second requirement for the
creation of a market environment that will benefit from waste ex-
change growth. Market feasibility consists of many different ele-
ments, but the central element is the establishment of markets for
recovered waste materials. Ancillary to this goal is the development
of mutual confidence among generators, users and transfer agents of
waste. 14
a. European Community
Aware of the myriad problems that beset efforts to increase re-
I l1. Toxic Substances Control Act, Pub. L. No. 94-469, 90 Stat. 2003 (1976) (codified in
40 C.F.R. §§ 702-75 (1983)). This law requires manufacturers to supply the EPA with a
pre-manufacturing notice of the substances it plans to put into the market and its possible
hazards. Furthermore, the EPA requires that all of these substances be accompanied by a
Material Safety Data Sheet that lists the contents, their character, their amount, and the
emergency procedures to follow in the event of a spill. Id Telephone interview with
Gabriel Williamson, Legal Department, Chemical Manufacturers' Association, Inc., Wash-
ington, D.C. (Feb. 8, 1984).
112. RCRA was passed in 1976. Section 6921(a) of RCRA envisioned the publication of
a list of hazardous wastes and their respective identification criteria by the EPA Administra-
tor within 18 months of the RCRA's enactment. It was not until 1981 that a list of hazard-
ous wastes was finally released by the EPA. Lists of Hazardous Wastes, 40 C.F.R. § 261.30
(1983). In contrast, the EC in its Council Directive on Toxic and Dangerous Waste listed
twenty-seven toxic or dangerous substances and materials that require priority considera-
tion. The list includes, among others, asbestos (fibers and dust), organic solvents and arsenic
compounds. 21 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L 84) 43, 48 (1978).
113. 14 ENV'T REP. (BNA) (Curr. Dev.) 1290 (Nov. 11, 1983).
114. U.S. EPA, supra note 72, at 2-4.
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cycling and marketing of wastes," 15 the EC has promulgated numer-
ous actions designed to improve the market's performance in waste
management by changing economic incentives, bolstering competi-
tion, and decreasing direct government regulations. These actions
include:
(1) studying methods that will make the market for secondary
(i.e., recycled) materials more stable and extensive;
(2) promoting waste exchanges by appropriate measures;
(3) conducting cost/benefit analyses and optimization studies
as a means of arriving at a more accurate assessment of the
types of processing to be used on waste;
(4) comparing a variety of organizational systems which
achieve the most efficient recovery of waste, especially of
toxic and dangerous waste;
(5) improving the flow of information between Community
members to industrialists on the supply and demand for
waste and on all information relating to waste and danger-
ous substances; and
(6) arousing public awareness of and encourage cooperation
with waste management programs through consumer infor-
mation and individual member state action.'" 6
115. 20 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 139) 1, 33 (1977). The European Community outlines
the main market economy problems as follows:
1. The instability, inadequacy, and unreliability of the market for secondary raw
materials is caused by short-term fluctuations in the demand for primary raw
materials. This unfortunate relationship translates into substantive changes in
the prices of secondary raw materials. Consequently, recycling industries have
a hard time obtaining investment and initiating technology programs. Further-
more, product standards often make it difficult to use secondary raw materials.
2. Shortage of exact economic data, especially the results of cost-benefit analyses
and optimization models showing the most efficient processes (recycling, recov-
ery of energy, and disposal) for the use of materials, taking into account the
economic viability of such processes, the organizational costs involved, the so-
cial cost of any deleterious effects on the environment and the assessment of
the social and economic consequences of an excessive use of scarce resources.
3. Inadequacy of reclamation processes which cannot be made profitable without
damaging the environment.
4. The difficulty of making reclamation processes pay for themselves, because
there are many operators concerned, their activities are different and they are
widely scattered. Recovery processes involve coordination and cooperation
among a large number of operators (for collection, sorting, transportation,
processing and reuse). The recovery of materials from household refuse is par-
ticularly difficult to organize.
Id para. 187.
116. Id para. 189. Point three is discussed in greater detail in the subsection on govern-
ment fiscal measures and waste exchange development. See infra notes 114-42 and accom-
panying text.
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These efforts embody the market precepts necessary for a more
efficient market economy--one that is self-regulating and self-cor-
recting. As these actions take hold on the market, the EC hopes that
recovered waste as a material in manufacturing and as an energy
source will become competitive and stable in the long run.' l7 Fi-
nally, with a greater exchange of information about waste, waste
will acquire economic value as a natural resource. These processes
enable waste to be bought, sold and traded like any other economic
commodity.
Of special significance is the EC's unqualified support of waste
exchanges expressed in point number two above. The linkage of
waste exchanges with waste recovery/recycling, waste information
exchange, and waste market studies make waste exchanges a key
element of the EC's comprehensive waste management policy. 1 8
Another important point is the EC's call for greater government and
industry cooperation in gathering and disseminating information
about the supply and demand for waste. This flow of information
will create greater confidence among generators, users and transfer
agents of waste." 19
The general public also plays a part in the EC program to ex-
pand the market for recovered waste.120 The EC is aware that con-
sumer habits contribute to the problem of unbridled consumption
and waste generation.' 2' Therefore, the public is encouraged
through "information campaigns on model initiatives taken by cer-
tain industries and local authorities"'' 22 to cooperate with the EC's
plans to conserve resources and control wastes. Member States are
also asked to increase the number of markets available to recovered
wastes by substituting recycled waste for virgin materials in their
procurement contracts. This governmental initiative is likely to cre-
ate some short-term benefits, but government action will be more
effective if it institutes policies for the "rational use of raw
materials." 123
117. O'Neill, supra note 27.
118. 20 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 139) 1, 33, para. 186 (1977). "The aim of a waste
management policy must be, with due allowance for economic and technical constraints, to
avoid the generation of waste and to ensure that materials are used as efficiently as possible
at every stage of manufacture and use." Id
119. U.S. EPA, supra note 72, at 4.
120. 20 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 139) 1, 31, para. 178 (1977).
121. Id. at 31, para. 189.
122. Id at 31, para. 178, and 33, para. 185.
123. Id. at 31, para. 178.
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Just as the general public and Member States are asked to con-
tribute to the development of a rational, well-integrated market ap-
proach to waste management, the EC and industry also play central
roles in this program. For example, besides its major planning and
coordination duties, the EC has developed a system of ecological
maps of European Community countries that correlates economic
demand with natural supplies and geographic location. This sche-
matic data is coupled with information on avoiding waste genera-
tion and the squandering of natural resources.124 Through this
mapping system, environmental action can be closely tied to eco-
nomic planning of Member States and industry. This demonstrates
a way that mutual confidence can be fostered among public and
private authorities concerning waste disposal and marketing.
Industry's role in the EC's comprehensive waste management
program is centered around the development of better recovery sys-
tems, more durable products, more intensive recycling, and greater
use of less polluting production alternatives. 25 In many respects, in-
dustry is asked to respond to all of the socio-economic and govern-
mental changes designed to make the common market function
more efficiently and cleanly. Industry, however, is not only an in-
strument of change and a market participant, but also the target of
all these programs.
b. United States
The United States is faced with many of the same economic
barriers that stifle the market potential for recycled materials in in-
dustrial and energy uses that affect the European Community na-
tions. To address these problems, the RCRA has authorized the
Secretary of Commerce to encourage greater commercialization of
proven resource recovery technology by:
(1) supplying accurate specifications for recovered materials; 26
(2) stimulating the development of markets for recovered
124. Id at 6, para. 9.2.
125. 26 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 46) 1, 4, para. 6 (1983). See also Ferrante, Nonhazard-
ous Municipal Solid Waste: Another Problem-Another Solution, 9 CAP. U.L. REV. 567, 570
(1980) (discusses the use of waste as an energy source).
126. These specifications will pertain to the physical and chemical properties of recov-
ered materials so that they might replace virgin or primary raw materials in a variety of uses.
Guidelines will also be promulgated to help federal agencies purchase recovered materials,
in order to spur the growth of this infant industry. 42 U.S.C. § 6952.
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materials; 127
(3) promoting proven technology; and
(4) providing a forum for the exchange of technical and eco-
nomic data concerning resource recovery facilities. 28
In an effort to increase the marketability of recovered waste, in
1980 the EPA and Congress formally linked energy conservation
with resources recovery. Citing significant savings in materials con-
servation, reduction of waste through material and energy recovery
from waste, and concurrent savings from an alternative energy
source other than scarce virgin organic materials, Congress promul-
gated a more intensive energy production effort through resource
recovery. 29
The RCRA also sets forth a federal procurement program to
pave the way for private industry to follow in making recovered or
secondary waste materials a competitive alternative to virgin materi-
als. 130 Good intentions, however, do not always produce the desired
results. This regulation authorizes federal agencies to purchase re-
cycled goods, but it also confficts with competitive bidding laws.'
3'
Competitive bidding laws require government agencies to buy vir-
gin primary materials over recycled goods because they are less ex-
pensive. 132 For example, California statutes encourage state
agencies to purchase recycled paper, but agencies are not permitted
to buy recycled paper if its price exceeds the cost of virgin paper.
33
Another problem with these procurement guidelines is the definition
of a recycled product. 134 For instance, standards ordering federal
127. The development of markets for recovered materials will take the form of identify-
ing the geographical location of existing and potential markets for such materials. Further-
more, the Secretary of Commerce is to list the various technical and economic barriers for
use of recovered materials. Finally, the Secretary is to help develop new uses for recovered
materials. 42 U.S.C. § 6953. See also id § 6983 (outlines the coordination, collection and
dissemination of information regarding solid waste recovery, facilities, markets and costs).
128. 42 U.S.C. § 6951(l)-(4).
129. Solid Waste Disposal Act Amendments of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-482, § 5006, 94
Stat. 2334, 2353 (1980) (codified in 40 C.F.R. §§ 240-71 (1983)).
130. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6962-6964. These sections outline the application, specification, en-
forcement and requirements for the procurement of recovered materials. All federal agen-
cies are encouraged to "procure items composed of the highest percentage of recovered
materials practicably consistent with maintaining a satisfactory level of competition." Id
§ 6962(c).
131. Halgren, Recycling and Resource Recoyery. State and funicipal Legal Impedimenis,
7 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 9 (1980).
132. Id
133. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 14784.3 (West 1981), repealed by 1983 Cal. Stat. 1231.
134. Halgren, supra note 131, at 8-9.
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agencies to purchase recycled goods are so broad that industrial/
production scrap is allowed to qualify as post-consumer waste.'
35
Paper mills are thus able to meet recycling standards by continuing
to recycle the production scrap rather than post-consumer waste, the
area of most solid waste accumulation.
36
One area of recovered materials/waste marketability where the
United States has been successful, however, is the use of sludge.
137
In essence, the EPA has developed methods that improve the per-
formance characteristics of resources recovered from sewage sludge
and enhance the attractiveness of this recovered waste to available
and potentially available markets.
38
The United States has also made some progress in creating a
cooperative atmosphere between government, industry and environ-
mentalists. 139 This greater cooperation will hopefully result in a
more efficient waste management program and a recovered materi-
als market. A group of chemical industry officials, environmental-
ists and the EPA are looking at how they can assist the EPA in
speeding cleanup work. They are also planning a permanent system
to mediate negotiations between the government and waste
generators. 140
Thus, both the EC and the United States have attempted to
create market and institutional avenues for greater waste material
usage by the public, industry and government. The success of these
programs is sometimes difficult to measure. However, the EC has
demonstrated its capacity to recycle and reuse a significant percent-
age of its waste.' 4 1 The United States still possesses only the skeletal
structure and mechanisms needed to generate greater markets for
waste materials. 142
135. Id.
136. Id
137. "Sludge is the residue of materials removed from waste water, sometimes called
sewage, during the process of waste water treatment." OFFICE OF WATER PROGRAM OPERA-
TIONS, UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, SLUDGE: RECYCLING FOR
AGRICULTURAL USE 3 (Oct. 1982).
138. 20 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 267) 35 (1977); see also OFFICE OF WATER PROGRAMS
OPERATIONS, supra note 137, at 12.
139. EPA, Industry, Environmentalists Meeting on Waste Site Cleanup Issues, 14 ENV'T
REP. (BNA) (Curr. Dev.) 1289 (Nov. 11, 1983).
140. Id
141. 20 O.J. EUR. COMM. 2 (No. C 112) 1, 31 (1977).
142. U.S. EPA, supra note 72, at 4.
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3. Legal and regulatory rationalization
For a waste exchange to operate to its fullest capacity, there is a
need for a well-tailored governmental program that places effective,
but not overly intrusive, controls on the production, transportation
and handling of waste.
a. European Community
First and foremost, the EC has instituted a permit process that
restricts and monitors the operation of any waste-related entity:
Installations, establishments or undertakings which carry out the
storage, treatment and/or deposit of toxic and dangerous waste
must obtain a permit from the competent authorities. Such waste
may be stored, treated, and/or deposited only by installations,
establishments or undertakings holding such permits. Undertak-
ings engaged in the carriage of toxic and dangerous waste shall
be controlled by the competent authorities of the Member
States. 4
3
By controlling the number and type of organizations that handle
waste, the EC and Member States can expand or contract the
number of these organizations to the amount and type of waste be-
ing generated.
Although the EC has directed Member States to implement
permit programs within certain given parameters, the final responsi-
bility and execution belongs to the Member States. The EC only
requires that these permits have information on the type and quan-
tity of waste, the technical requirements, the precautions to be
taken, the disposal site(s), and the methods of disposal.' 4 This sys-
tem is just one of the general EC measures adopted "to ensure an
effective protection of the environment. . .[by providing] for a uni-
form system of permits for undertakings which store, treat and/or
ship toxic and dangerous waste; whereas unauthorized holders of
toxic and dangerous waste should have it stored and/or treated only
by authorized undertakings."'' 45
Where EC Member States have been allowed some discretion
143. 21 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 84) 43, 45, para. 9 (1978).
144. Id See also Council Directive on Waste, supra note 80, at 40-41.
145. 21 O.J. Eut. COMM. (No. L 84) 43, 45, art. 9 (1978). The Directive on Waste re-
quires competent authorities in the Member States to plan for the rationalization of the
collection, sorting and treatment of waste. The rationalization is to include data that will
facilitate control, direction and monitoring of the movement and final destination of wastes.
18 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 194) 39, 40 (1975).
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over waste management policies, the EC has still found it necessary
to implement community-wide policies. A good example of this pro-
gression is in the area of waste oil disposal. In December, 1968,
West Germany enacted the Waste Oil Disposal Act. 146 This act im-
posed a special charge on the producer, importer or dealer of an oil
product. 147 The revenue from this charge was used to support enter-
prises that collect, dispose of or recycle waste oil.14 s As a result of
the Waste Oil Disposal Act, the West German waste oil industry
became profitable and the industries that used waste oil grew more
cost-efficient. This development caused an economic imbalance
among Member States. France and Italy responded with waste oil
taxes of their own which were lower than West Germany's. 149 Con-
fronted with growing competitive disparities, the European Com-
munity issued the Directive on the Disposal of Waste Oil in 1975.150
This Directive sought to create "an efficient and coherent system of
treatment for waste oils, which will neither create barriers to intra-
Community trade nor affect competition, [which] should apply to all
such products, even those which are composed only in part of oil,
and [which] should provide for their safe treatment under economi-
cally satisfactory conditions. . . ."I '" The EC was able to conform
these various waste oil laws through Article 92 of the Treaty estab-
lishing the European Economic Community.' 52 This article is the
EC's most potent tool for establishing a uniform common market in
Western Europe. It also has a concurrent effect on the rationaliza-
tion of various Member State laws.
146. Act on Measures to Ensure the Disposal of Waste Oil (Altolgesetz), 23 December
1968, BGBI, part I, at 1419 [hereinafter cited as Waste Oil Disposal Act].
147. COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, STATE OF THE ENVIRONMENT:
FIRST REPORT 130 (1977). See also Thiem, Environmental Laws in the Federal Republic of
German--The Position at April1976, 345,358, in EUROPEAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: LEGAL
AND ECONOMIC APPRAISAL (S. Ercman ed. 1977).
148. Waste Oil Disposal Act, supra note 146, § 2, reprinted in EUROPEAN ENVIRONMEN-
TAL LAW, supra note 147, at 358.
149. COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, supra note 147.
150. Council Directive on the Disposal of Waste Oil, 18 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 194) 23
(1975). Cf. Waste Oil Recovery Rule Proposal Delayed until Mid-1983, Gorsuch Says, 12
ENV'T REP. (BNA) (Cur. Dev.) 1751 (Apr. 30, 1982).
151. Council Directive on Disposal of Waste Oil, 18 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 194) 23
(1975).
152. Save as otherwise provided in this Treaty, any aid granted by a Member State
or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to
distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain
goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Member States, be incompatible
with the common market.
EEC Treaty, 298 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 92.
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In an effort to study different avenues of overcoming the un-
wieldiness of investment into resource recovery, the European Com-
munity established the Committee on Waste Management. 153 The
Committee was conceived to:
(1) formulate a waste management policy that would ensure the
best use of resources and the safe and effective disposal of
waste;
(2) coordinate different technical, economic, administrative, and
legal measures that could prevent the production of wastes or
ensure their reuse, recycling or disposal; and
(3) implement European Community Directives on waste man-
agement and to formulate fresh proposals for Directives in
waste management. 154
The most important of the Committee's three purposes is the coordi-
nation of different technical, economic, administrative and legal
measures to promote the reuse and recycling of waste. A central
governing body of this kind helps to stabilize market and regulatory
trends, which in turn fosters capital expenditure on waste
technology.
b. United States
The United States also has a permit program for any person or
entity "operating a facility for the treatment, storage, or disposal of
hazardous waste identified or listed under this subtitle to have a per-
mit issued pursuant to this section."' 55 One noticeable exception
from the list of entities affected by this regulation is the transporter
of hazardous waste. Transporters are covered by the Hazardous
Materials Transportation Act, which requires "each person who
transports or causes to be transported or shipped in commerce haz-
ardous materials . . . to be registered. ' 156 One problem with this
regulation is that any person or entity who is connected with the
transportation in interstate commerce of certain hazardous materials
may be required to submit a registration statement to the Secretary
153. 19 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 115) 73 (1976).
154. Id
155. 42 U.S.C. § 6925(a).
156. Hazardous Materials Transportation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1805(b) (1982). The EC has a
comparable law in the Council Directive on Transfrontier Shipment of Hazardous Materials,
26 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 186) 3 (1983). For a discussion on the Commerce Clause impli-
cations of the transportation of waste, see Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
1984]
Loy. L.A. Intl & Comp. L. J[
of Transportation.' 57 This broad definition of who is required to
register with the Secretary of Transportation overlaps with the per-
mit program in the RCRA.158
To further complicate matters, many states also require that all
waste facilities obtain a permit from the appropriate authority. Cali-
fornia, for example, requires that all operators of hazardous waste
facilities acquire a permit following the review and decision of the
Department of Health.15 9 Although these permits and registrations
serve a useful purpose, they often "indirectly provide more disincen-
tives than incentives for waste reduction."'
60
According to Representative Ike Skelton, Chairman of the
House Small Busines Subcommittees on Energy, Environment, and
Safety, "treatment of hazardous waste is constrained by complex,
lengthy, and expensive procedures for obtaining a permit." Repre-
sentative Skelton also stated that many businesses, small businesses
in particular, did not have the time, money or expertise to acquire
an RCRA waste handling permit. 161 Joel Hirschorn, senior associate
of the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment, observed
that" 'no matter how good and useful a new idea is for dealing with
a toxic waste problem, current regulatory policies and uncertainties
combined with the absence of direct support for innovations over-
power normal market forces and stand in the way of commercializing
such innovations.' "162
Similar to the EC's Committee on Waste Management, the
RCRA created Resource Conservation and Recovery Panels com-
posed of federal, state and local representatives, and private con-
tractors. 63 Ideally, the panels would provide technical, marketing,
157. Hazardous Materials Transportation Act, supra note 156.
158. 42 U.S.C. § 6925.
159. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 25200-25205 (West Supp. 1984).
160. OTA REPORT, supra note 59, at 17. One disincentive of the RCRA permit process
is the amount of information required on the application, which includes:
1. estimates with respect to the composition, quantities and concentrations of any
such hazardous waste identified or listed under this subtitle, or combinations of
any hazardous waste and any other solid waste, proposed to be disposed of,
treated, transported or stored, and the time, frequency or rate at which such
waste is proposed to be disposed of, treated, transported or stored; and
2. the site at which such hazardous waste or the products of treatment of such
hazardous waste will be disposed of, treated, transported to or stored.
42 U.S.C. § 6925(b).
161. Panel Told Impediments Stfle Development of New Hazardous Waste Disposal Tech-
niques, 14 ENV'T REP. (BNA) (Curr. Dev.) 1251 (Nov. 4, 1983).
162. Id (emphasis added).
163. 42 U.S.C. § 6913.
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financial and institutional services at no cost to state and local gov-
ernments. The panels' goal is to generate information for govern-
ment use as opposed to use by private industry. State and local
governments, in this scheme, are seen as the cutting edge of waste
management.
There is evidence, however, that this scheme is not being imple-
mented as planned. Some local communities have had to establish
their own programs. California's Orange County Board of Supervi-
sors recently approved a plan to create an Intra-Agency Task Force
to study the feasibility of a toxic data bank by a unanimous vote. 164
This Intra-Agency Task Force, composed of the County Adminis-
trative Office, Health Department, Sanitation District, Fire Depart-
ment and Sheriff's Department, were given forty-five days to
organize priorities, methods and goals regarding the handling of
toxic substances and disposal of waste. 65 The Task Force was also
directed to advise the Board of Supervisors on whether the County
should form a permanent Advisory Committee on Waste Manage-
ment. The Advisory Committee would then perform many of the
same functions of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Panels
outlined in RCRA.166 Chris Arnold, senior analyst of the County
Administrative Office, commented that the lack of federal/state fi-
nancing and program coordination precluded Orange County from
adopting these measures earlier. 67
In direct contrast to the United States' problems in waste man-
agement coordination is the EC example. Environmental protection,
sound economic management of renewable and non-renewable re-
sources, and the reduction of dependence on imported raw materials
as motivations, make the EC's campaign against waste both imme-
164. Interview with Chris Arnold, supra note 63. The toxic data bank is a compilation of
information gathered from industry regarding the types of toxic materials they use. This
data bank would be used for emergency resonse and pollution prevention purposes by the
ten cities comprising Orange County. See also L.A. Times, Jan. 1, 1984, part I, at 8, col. 4.
New York Governor Mario Cuomo has recently ordered the state to organize the nation's
first program compelling industries to disclose the toxic substances they use and the toxic
wastes they generate. The comprehensive list will provide important information to prevent
pollution and strengthen emergency preparedness. Id
165. Interview with Chris Arnold, supra note 63.
166. Id
167. Id Colorado Senate President Fred Anderson, before a Senate Subcommittee, said
that "'EPA's delays, and of late, change of mind about promulgating regulations has
prompted a "wait and see" attitude among many states' officials.'" State Success at Control-
ling Waste, Siting Said To Hinge on Federal Program, 12 ENV'T REP. 1750 (Apr. 30, 1982).
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diate and forceful. 6s There are several reasons for this result. First,
industry began to reclaim expensive raw materials used in produc-
tion and to develop new recovery systems on a larger scale. 69 An-
other reason is that consumers learned to alter their attitudes and
behaviors about waste and recycled waste products. 170 Finally, as
the EC environmental program assumed a preventive character, the
EC benefitted from the two-edged advantage of environmental pro-
tection measures which support and complement economic
development. 17'
Each of the major EC waste directives72 has a direct and indi-
rect impact on the development and operation of waste exchange
clearinghouses. These directives, plus EC information programs,
form a technical, market and regulatory basis that can support local,
regional, national and even international waste exchange clearing-
houses. Although the EC's programs have not been without their
shortcomings, 73 they have organized the type of governmental, in-
dustrial and public cooperation which overcomes the political, eco-
nomic and social conflict inherent in international or multi-state
organizations.
The United States, through TOSCA, RCRA and the Hazard-
ous Materials Transportation Act, has developed a strong regulatory
foundation in the area of waste management and resource recovery.
Although the United States has been successful in placing regula-
tions on waste generators, transporters and disposers, its success has
also been a major stumbling block to achieving a balanced techni-
cal, market and regulatory foundation for waste exchange clearing-
house development. The EPA's emphasis in enforcing RCRA has
168. 20 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 139) 1, 31, para. 178 (1977). See also 26 O.J. EuR.
COMM. (No. C 46) 1, 3, para. 4 (1978). "The Community's environment policy, as indeed is
true of national policies as a whole, has brought substantial results in a relatively short
period and despite growing economic problems." Id
169. 20 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 139) 1, 31, para. 178 (1978).
170. Id
171. 26 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 46) 1, 3, para. 4 (1983).
172. See 18 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 194) 39, 40, art. 3 (1975); 19 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No.
L 108) 41, 42, art. 5 (1976); 21 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 54) 19, 20, art. 1(c) (1978); 21 O.J.
EUR. COMM. (No. L 84) 43, 44, art. 1(c) (1978).
173. [Flrom an environmental point of view, the U.S. approach to the control of the
effects of chemicals in the environment, unwieldly as it seems, appears to be prefer-
able to any European approach. On the other hand, it must be remembered that
no European country has the resources of the entire U.S. and that, in practical
terms, allowance should be made for this fact.
Scannel, supra note 87, at 25.
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not been "on reducing waste generation but on management of
wastes once they are generated, and EPA has not generally pursued
the resource recovery aspects of RCRA."' 174 Furthermore, many of
the EPA's current regulatory strategies and tactics may actually act
as disincentives for waste reduction and treatment activities (i.e., re-
cycling and reclamation).175 A senior associate for the Congressional
Office of Technology Assessment stated that the most critical need
now appears to be removing government impediments to companies
who want to enter the waste recycling and reclamation market.
176
The above discussion has set forth the significance of technical/
informational networks, market availability, and legal/regulatory
structures to the creation of an environment that can support and
benefit from a waste exchange clearinghouse. The EC and the
United States have been both successful and unsuccessful in achiev-
ing a more market-oriented approach to waste management. Infor-
mation among waste market participants has increased due to
various information programs in the EC and the United States.
Market competition, however, has not yet reached a level where
markets for waste can eclipse government regulation. Both the EC
and the United States have used government regulation to achieve
similar ends with varying degrees of success. The EC, however, has
tried to maintain a moderate amount of government regulation,
while the United States has relied heavily on such regulation.
C. The Economic Cost of Waste Regulations and Waste Exchange
Development
"Environmental laws are a cost factor in industrial production;
they run counter to industry's paramount interests, profitability and
cost savings, and are opposed by industry in both enactment and
enforcement."'' 77 For this very reason, disposal, administrative and
transport costs regarding waste transfers must be balanced with the
savings accrued by foregoing the use of virgin materials. 78 This sec-
tion analyzes the economic costs associated with waste management
174. OTA REPORT, supra note 59, at 18.
175. Id
176. Panel Told Impediments Stile Developments of New Hazardous Waste Disposal
Techniques, supra note 161, at 1251.
177. Rehbinder, Controlling the Environmental Enforcement Defcit." West Germany, 24
AM. J. COMp. L. 373, 374 (1976).
178. U.S. EPA, supra note 72, at 4.
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and governmental regulations and how this might affect waste ex-
change development.
The incentives to forego waste disposal come in two forms:
(1) the incentive to obey waste management laws or face govern-
ment prosecution; and (2) the economic incentive costs of saving
and potential profit through recycling waste. Probably one of the
best examples of the first incentive is the Los Angeles Toxic Waste
Strike Force. This arm of the Los Angeles City Attorney's Office is
composed of representatives from five agencies-Los Angeles
County Health Department, city fire and police, the city Bureau of
Sanitation, and the City Attorney's Environmental Protection sec-
tion. 179 The Strike Force is designed to bring charges against illegal
dumpers of toxic chemicals and thus stem the "'economic incentives
to be dishonest'" and "'send people to jail and thereby raise the
ante' ". 180 This idea of a negative cost to industry is further stressed
by Los Angeles City Attorney Ira Reiner, who believes that "'[y]our
basic white-collar executive who makes a decision to dump toxic
chemicals believes a fine is simply the cost of doing business.' "s181
Although the EPA is trying to rejuvenate its enforcement program,
it lacks the police power that the Strike Force has to obtain evidence
and impose criminal penalties. 8
2
The second incentive involves a positive approach that appeals
to industry's desire for cost minimization and profit maximization.
Before there can be any incentive for alternatives to landfill dump-
ing, there must be economically viable alternatives. The EC has ad-
dressed this issue by:
(1) emphasizing the prevention of waste and the design of prod-
ucts which facilitate recycling;
(2) concentrating on programs that feature agricultural and en-
ergy uses of waste; and
(3) encouraging the development of new technology which facili-
tates waste recycling or which removes the production of
waste. 183
In much the same way, the United States has sought to provide al-
179. Stein, Toxic Waste: New Hazardfor Dumpers, L.A. Times, Mar. 22, 1984, part I, at
1, col. 1.
180. See Los Angeles Throws the Book at Toxic Dangers, Bus. WK., Jan. 16, 1984, at
100a.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 100d.
183. 26 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 46) 1, 14, para. 29 (1983).
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ternatives to landfill dumping. 184 Measures to boost the commercial
viability of waste management alternatives are designed to provide
waste generators with economic benefits.
There are a number of ways economic benefits can accrue to
the waste generator. Where waste reduction technology is readily
available and reasonably priced, the costs associated with waste re-
duction through changes in production may be more than offset by
lower waste management costs. Also, where materials or energy can
be recovered from materials before they are discarded, a profit can
be made through their re-use or sale. 185
Government funding of greater recycling efforts is another area
where incentives and disincentives play a role in waste exchange
development. Whether a government should use direct payments or
special depreciation allowances is a matter of debate. 186 RCRA
takes the more direct approach through a grant process. 87 One ben-
efit of this direct payment program is that the government can re-
duce or increase the amount granted according to public policy and
national priorities.88 Furthermore, this direct payment program re-
garding waste management facilitates the measurement of pollution
control benefits to the society relative to each dollar spent. 8 9 This
program, however, is partially negated by the RCRA regulatory
scheme. 190
The EC is noncommittal about what fiscal measures it should
184. See supra notes 126-28; contra "Only about 10 percent of EPA's current R&D ef-
forts for hazardous waste are developed as alternatives to land disposal. Emerging thermal,
coal and physichemical treatment technologies are at a point where they could substantially
benefit from more R&D support." OTA REPORT, supra note 59, at 23.
185. OTA REPORT, supra note 59, at 23. "Industry is also urged to use less hazardous
materials in the production and manufacturing of products. In the face of rising costs for
energy and raw materials, recycling has already established itself as an alternative, although
it has limitations." See L.A. Times, supra note 4, col. 4.
186. See 0. DELOGU & H. SOELL, FISCAL MEASURES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTEC-
TION-Two DIVERGENT VIEWS (1976). See also Wall St. J., May 23, 1984, at 1, col. 5 (ex-
plains the mixed results of chemical waste taxes used by states to clean up abandoned waste
dumps).
187. 42 U.S.C. § 6986.
188. 0. DELOGU & H. SOELL, supra note 186, at 17.
189. Id See Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing Government Policy.- A
Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures, 83 HARV. L. REV. 705 (1976) (argues that
the tax incentive is inferior to a direct grant as a means of achieving social goals).
190. The current regulatory structure does not directly encourage consideration of
alternative, safer and more permanent solutions to problems posed by the very
complex nature of hazardous waste.
U .. ntil the private sector perceives the regulatory structures as not containing a
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use to create incentives for greater resource recovery and waste pre-
vention. The only EC program in this area is the periodic publish-
ing of a balance sheet showing the availability of raw materials and
secondary raw materials.' 9' The EC also plans to initiate incentive
schemes for the recovery of secondary raw materials and the ex-
tended use of products. 92 A major reason for the EC's broad lan-
guage in this area is Article 92 of the EEC Treaty. 93 This article is
intended to free "international trade from competitive distor-
tions." 194 The EC's adherence to Article 92, however, has led to
many problems with Member States who have tried to implement
special depreciation allowances 95 for waste reduction and resource
recovery technology. 96
What is evident from the foregoing section is that government
fiscal policy and the costs associated with governmental regulations
can have a direct impact on the formation of waste exchanges. Fis-
cal measures, however, whether through direct subsidies or depreci-
ation allowances, are not the sole answer to waste exchange
development. Waste exchanges will come to fruition only through
an integrated fiscal, technical, legal and market approach.
IV. WASTE EXCHANGES IN WEST GERMANY AND CALIFORNIA
In West Germany, the federal government has based its envi-
ronmental policy on these principles:
(1) The Principle of Anticipation:
Environmental policy should not only concern itself with
warding off imminent danger and correcting damage which
bias in favor of land disposal technologies, investment in new treatment technology
R&D and commercial development may be limited.
OTA REPORT, supra note 59, at 23-24.
191. 26 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 46) i, 14, para. 29 (1983).
192. Id
193. EEC Treaty, 298 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 92.
194. 0. DELOGU & H. SOELL, supra note 186, at 69.
195. Special depreciation allowances work their effects primarily with regard to
possibilities for self-financing. In the year in which such special depreciation al-
lowances are claimed, the result is a comparatively lower taxable profit.
...As a result, the funds available for self-financing purposes will be increased.
After the asset has been completely written off on the books, the 'financial aid
temporarily granted' must, however, be gradually written back over the following
years on a pro rata basis until the facility in question can no longer be used, with
the result that profits will be increased.
Id at 64-65.
196. Id. at 61, 68-70.
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has already been caused. It should also ensure that the re-
sources of nature are protected and conserved;
(2) The Polluter-Pays Principle:
The costs of avoiding, removing or otherwise remedying en-
vironmental damage should be borne by those who cause it.
Measures to attain this end include process standards, prod-
uct standards, orders, prohibitions and other specific regula-
tions, as well as taxation provisions; and
(3) The Principle of Cooperation:
Environmental policy can only achieve viable results through
a close working relationship between the Federation, local
authorities, interest groups in society, and individual citizens
themselves. 19
7
The principles of anticipation and cooperation closely resemble
those of the EC. The similarity between EC and Member State poli-
cies is an important reason for the minimal conflict within the EC
and also accounts for the speedy implementation of EC Waste
Directives.
The pertinent legislation in West Germany is the Abfallbesi-
tigungsgesetz (AbfG) or the Waste Disposal Law. 198 Its primary
objectives are the recycling of wastes by providing suitable processes
for all wastes, creation of sufficient disposal capacity, delivery of all
waste to disposal installations, and the operation of disposal
plants-together known as Organized Disposal. 199 These objectives
were most recently augmented in 1975 to include the goal of exploit-
ing all possibilities of reuse and reutilization of wastes. This objec-
tive requires that each individual industry exhaust all possibilities
for reuse or recycling before it is allowed to use some form of land-
fill disposal or treatment process.
This emphasis on the waste recycling market and the preven-
tion of waste is further advanced by waste exchanges. The Cham-
bers of Industry and Commerce have instituted waste exchanges
(Abfallborse) to facilitate this recycling process. 200 These waste ex-
197. 0. SPRINGER, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY: PROTECTION AND MANAGEMENT OF THE
ENVIRONMENT 25 (1978).
198. Waste Disposal Act (AbgG) BGB1, part I, at 873 et seq. (7 June 1972).
199. H. STEIGER & 0. KIMMINICH, THE LAW AND PRACTICE RELATING TO POLLUTION
CONTROL IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 251 (1976). See also Zalob, Current
Legislation and Practice of Compulsory Recycling An International Perspective, 19 NAT. RE-
SOURCES J. 611, 624 (1979).
200. J. MCLOUGHLIN, THE LAW AND PRACTICE RELATING TO POLLUTION CONTROL IN
THE MEMBER STATES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 290 (1976).
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changes advance West German principles of environmental policy,
provide a wider scope of options to waste generators regarding their
waste, and create a more organized and steady market for re-
cyclers.201 Through advertisements in the Chambers of Industry and
Commerce journals, waste exchanges list a variety of available
wastes under a code number. The waste exchanges even have sam-
pling methods to ensure what type of waste is being exchanged. 20 2
Under the EC's cooperative, market-conscious waste management
program and its outright advocacy of waste exchanges in its 1977
Programme, waste exchanges in Europe have achieved a permanent
place in the market economy and the market solution to waste
disposal.20 3
B. California
In 1972, Dr. David L. Storm of the California Department of
Health Services Toxic Substances Control Division developed the
California Waste Exchange. This waste exchange was an effort to
reduce landfill dumping and to encourage recycling of wastes.2°4
Today, the California Waste Exchange is responsible for the re-
cycling of fifty waste items that were previously dumped.20 5 Other
waste exchanges across the country have also achieved some suc-
cess. For example, the Midwest Industrial Waste Exchange covers
forty-seven waste streams, while the Industrial Material Exchange
Service includes some forty-nine waste solvents and materials.
Since 1982, the California Waste Exchange has been greatly
helped by general waste recycling and specific regulations geared
toward the Exchange. 206 The Department of Health Services is man-
dated to "encourage the reduction or exchange, or both, of hazard-
ous waste." 20 7 Furthermore, the Department of Health Services is to
201. H. STEIGER & 0. KIMMINICH, supra note 199, at 260.
202. Id.
203. Wasserman, Attempts at Control Over Toxic Waste, 15 J. WORLD TRADE L. 410,
425 (1981). Most of the Western European countries have waste exchanges on a local and
regional level. The Nordic Waste Exchange (composed of Denmark, the Netherlands and
Finland) and the West German waste exchanges have been the leaders in this field since
1972. Id
204. Telephone interview with Bob McCormick, Waste Management Specialist, Califor-
nia Department of Health Services (Oct. 10, 1983).
205. Letter from Bob McCormick, Waste Management Specialist, Department of Health
Services, regarding the California Waste Exchange (Oct. 26, 1983).
206. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25170(b), (g), (h) (West Supp. 1984).
207. Id. § 251700).
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establish and maintain a waste information clearinghouse which
will consist of a comprehensive record of wastes that "may be re-
cyclable." 20 8 This regulation also requires every producer of hazard-
ous waste to supply the California Waste Exchange with
information on such wastes.20 9 This information is made available
to recyclers of waste on a confidential basis so as to protect the waste
generators' trade secrets.210 By making wastes available on a confi-
dential basis, the California Waste Exchange hurdles a major stum-
bling block to the establishment of waste exchanges.211
The California Waste Exchange is notable as a pioneer and as
one of the few waste exchanges in the United States that is state-
owned and operated. Most waste exchanges in the United States are
run by industry associations or chambers of commerce. 212 The Cali-
fornia Waste Exchange benefits by having a legally mandated waste
information supply.213 On the other hand, other waste exchanges
also rely upon waste generators, waste recyclers and secondary ma-
terial users to make their wants and needs known to the exchange
on a voluntary basis. The incentives for joining a waste exchange
are many, chief among them being the economic savings of avoiding
high disposal costs and the accompanying benefit of reduced materi-
als cost. 214 All of these waste exchanges also employ the manifest
system mandated by the RCRA to identify the wastes, maintain
confidentiality, and match the wastes available with those
208. Id § 25170(k).
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Interview with Chris Arnold, supra note 63. Telephone interview with Gabriel Wil-
liamson, supra note 111.
212. See, e.g., St. Louis Regional Commerce and Growth Association, Midwest Indus-
trial Waste Exchange, Clearinghouse Catalog and News (Aug. 1983). The Midwest Industrial
Waste Exchange (MIWE) is comprised of the Chamber of Commerce of Greater Kansas
City, the Minnesota Association of Commerce and Industry, the Nebraska Department of
Environmental Control, the Missouri Environmental Improvement Authority, and the
Center for Industrial Research and Service at Ames, Iowa. Id at 1. The ultimate goal of
MIWE is to gain the membership of all the states represented in the Midwest Governors'
Association. 12 ENV'T REP. (BNA) (Curr. Dev.) 986 (Dec. 11, 1981).
213. The California Waste Exchange has 126 wastes listed for possible recycling or
purchase. California Waste Exchange, A Newsletter/Catalog at 13-26 (Spring 1983).
214. For example, a manufacturer had 75 drums of surplus quicklime, a hazardous
waste, that he needed to dispose of, and was looking at approximately $2,000 in costs. The
manufacturer contacted the California Waste Exchange which directed him to a sewage
treatment plant. The manufacturer ended up selling his waste for a small profit and the
purchaser at the treatment plan saved $1,200. Alternative Technology and Policy Develop-
ment Section, supra note 24, at 6.
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Waste exchanges in the EC and the United States have yet to
become more than waste information clearinghouses. 2 6 Waste ex-
changes can also provide important services such as legal counseling
and negotiation services. 21 7 The final evolutionary stage of waste ex-
changes would involve actual waste materials exchange. Waste ex-
changes would become waste brokers that buy, sell and trade waste
for a profit.21 8 This process would require highly skilled technical,
managerial, marketing and handling facilities, as well as large capi-
tal investment.
In the past decade, waste exchanges in the EC and the United
States have made progress in facilitating waste recycling. Waste ex-
change in the United States, however, has not reached the level of
market and institutional acceptance that it has in the EC. The con-
trast between the EC and the United States in this area points to the
need for strong initiative in the development of a proper technical,
legal, fiscal and market environment for waste exchange growth.
This initiative can come from the private or public sector, as evi-
denced by West Germany and California, respectively. Along with
the necessity for positive initiatives in this area, there also needs to
be a realization that private industry and government can and
should combine their efforts to solve the problem of waste manage-
ment. The waste exchange system can be created by government-
industry cooperation; in return, the waste exchange system can gen-
erate government-industry cooperation.
V. CONCLUSION
The foregoing discussion is based upon the premise that what
the market economy has wrought, the market economy can rectify.
Market excesses in natural resources development, product manu-
facturing and disposal have created a waste management problem
of substantial political, economic and social magnitude. The market
has failed, or has been slow, to develop adequate countermeasures
to the cancer-like growth of industrial, residential, municipal and
215. Letter from Bob McCormick, supra note 205. See also Senkan & Stauffer, supra
note 1, at 39. Before the RCRA, there were only four waste exchanges in operation in the
United States; in 1981, however, there were approximately twenty-seven waste exchanges in
operation. Id.
216. U.S. EPA, supra note 72, at 7.
217. Id
218. Id
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agricultural waste. The major causes of this market failure are cost
factors, 219 misguided government regulations, 220 and persistent so-
cial habits.22'
An integral element in the market economy's ability and capac-
ity to correct its waste management problems is the waste exchange
clearinghouse. As a market facilitator and catalyst, a waste ex-
change can bolster market efficiency by increasing market-price in-
centives to recycle222 rather than dumping wastes in landfills. It can
also provide greater opportunities for entrepreneurs to enter the
waste management field. Most importantly, a waste exchange sys-
tem, with its reliance upon and use of the dynamics of supply and
demand, places the central focus of waste management on the mar-
ket economy and its participants, instead of solely on the
government.
Another major advantage of a waste exchange system is that it
does not completely co-opt government waste regulations, but sim-
ply emphasizes the managerial aspects of waste regulation rather
than its protective aspects. The management of waste in the envi-
ronment is important for society's survival and growth, as well as for
the preservation of the environment for future generations. 223 Fur-
thermore, waste exchanges force industry to adopt policies and pro-
219. See text accompanying notes 12-23.
220. "Government pollution control regulations advocated pollution control only after
pollution was created by industrial production, etc.: These regulations have created a
'Catch-22' situation. It takes resources to remove pollution. Pollution removal generates
residue. It takes more resources to dispose of this residue. And, disposal of residue also
produces pollution." Ling, Industrys Environmental Challenge- Prevention, 12 ENVTL. F. 21,
22 (Nov. 1982). Wet oxidation, however, is an alternative treatment method that reduces
chemical wastes to nontoxic inert compounds by breaking down the molecular structure of
the waste through the use of heat and pressure without residual pollution. See L.A. Times,
supra note 4, at cols. 4-5.
221. For too long, Americans have seen conservation of energy and natural resources as
repressive and un-American. "Use" has been the key word in both energy and natural re-
sources management. However, viewing conservation as a mere adjustment, rather than an
overhaul of our energy and natural resource consumption, can encourage changes in capital
stock and daily behavior that promote energy savings in an economically and socially non-
disruptive manner. Yergin, Conservation: The Energy Source of the Future, in ENERGY Fu-
TURE: REPORT OF ThE ENERGY PROJECT AT THE HARVARD BusINEsS SCHOOL 173, 178 (R.
Stobaugh & D. Yergin 3d ed. 1983). See also text accompanying notes 119-22.
222. Recycling or recovery of waste frequently involves familiar technology. "One of the
most important aspects is the recovery of waste heat, a major task for industrial retrofit
.... Still another is the reclamation of waste products. To recycle aluminum, for example,
requires only 7 percent as much energy as does getting aluminum from ore." Yergin, supra
note 221, at 199.
223. Ling, supra note 220, at 25.
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cedures for waste transfer and recovery. In so doing, waste
exchanges and industry can lessen or perhaps eliminate the need for
strict laws and regulations that can be counterproductive. 224
The previous comparison of the respective waste management
policies of the EC and the United States has revealed that, on the
whole, the EC and the United States have promulgated similar
goals, principles, programs and even specific regulations regarding
waste management and resource recovery. It has also been demon-
strated, however, that similarity in form does not always mean simi-
larity in substance. It is the substance of the EC program that sets it
above and apart from the United States concerning waste manage-
ment and waste exchanges. The EC Programme was founded on the
principles of harmonious economic development and the approxi-
mation of laws among its Member States.225 These organizing prin-
ciples enable the EC to design and implement coordinated waste
management directives. With the aid of Article 92,226 the EC is able
to avoid conflicts in separate Member State policies while tailoring
diverse Member State actions into a congruous whole. However, the
EC's reliance on Article 92 must be lessened in order for Member
States and their respective industries to develop more innovations in
waste technology and resource recovery without fear of EC preemp-
tion. Especially significant for the EC is that this policy is infused
with the spirit of cooperation and uniformity reflected in all EC pol-
icies, which helps to overcome inherent political and economic dif-
ferences of Member States. Not only is this cooperative spirit
evident on the international level, but it is also a major characteris-
tic of national policies.227
224. Id.
225. The Community shall have as its task, by establishing a common market and
progressively approximating the economic policies of Member States, to promote
throughout the community a harmonious development of economic activities, a
continuous and balanced expansion, an increase in stability, an accelerated raising
of the standard of living and closer relations between the States belonging to it.
EEC Treaty, 298 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 2. Contra Sullivan, The Decline of Europe, NEWSWEEK,
April 9, 1984, at 44 (discusses the economic and political problems that plague Europe and
the EEC in particular).
226. EEC Treaty, 298 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 92. Only recently has the EC begun to use Arti-
cle 90 as its main enforcement tool. See Page, Member States, Public Undertakings andArti-
cle 90, 7 EUR. L. REV. 19 (1982). Article 90 enjoins Member States in respect of public
actions to "neither enact nor maintain in force any measure contrary to the rules contained
in this Treaty and in particular those rules provided for in Article 7 and Articles 85 to 94."
EEC Treaty, 298 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 90.
227. See, e.g., K. HARDACH, supra note 2, at 153-57 (discusses the centralization of legis-
lative power and the role of public-law entities which influence economic policy by repre-
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Another fundamental difference between the EC and the
United States program is the priority the EC gives to the prevention
of waste and the conservation of natural resources. 228 By making
waste prevention a primary objective, the EC averts the "Catch-22"
situation where an inordinate amount of financial, technical and
human resources are used to combat waste but concurrently gener-
ate waste in so doing (e.g., incinerating chemical waste, but produc-
ing toxic fumes in the process). 229 Prevention also advances the
cause of waste recovery and waste exchange, because alternatives to
dumping waste are legitimized by laws that make these waste pre-
vention measures profitable. In the same vein, the EC has embraced
a policy of conserving natural resources.230 The EC has decided to
take effective action to conserve and improve the environment and
to combat pollution and nuisances.231 To this end, the EC has
adopted an "adroit mixture of measures--of price, regulation, in-
centives, information, and research and development." 232 These are
the same types of measures that help to create waste exchanges.
Conservation of natural resources, prevention of waste and waste
exchange development complement one another in a way that ad-
vances a market approach to waste management.
The experience of the United States is different because it has
become a victim of its own regulatory devices. EPA waste manage-
ment regulations can be likened to "the great beast of laws and reg-
ulations . . . sometimes randomly enacted and applied . . . that
'knows no glut, but feeding, she grows hungrier than she was.' "233
senting heterogeneous groups and ideas); S. COHEN, MODERN CAPITALIST PLANNING: THE
FRENCH MODEL 3-20 (1977) (discusses the features of the Monnet Plan or indicative plan-
ning, and the idea of "enlightened self-interest"); W. BAUM, THE FRENCH ECONOMY AND
THE STATE (1958); J. ARDAGH, THE NEW FRENCH REVOLUTION: A SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC
STUDY OF FRANCE, 1945-1968 (1969); and S. LIEBERMAN, THE GROWTH OF EUROPEAN
MIXED ECONOMIES 1945-1970: A CONCISE STUDY OF THE ECONOMIC EVOLUTION OF SIX
COUNTRIES (1977) (discusses the trend in Western Europe where state intervention in eco-
nomic life became stronger over time and national planning eventually became an inherent
feature of post-1945 European capitalism).
228. See text accompanying note 47.
229. Ling, supra note 220, at 22.
230. 20 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 139) 1, 7, para. 16 (1977).
231. Id
232. Yergin, supra note 221, at 235.
233. Ling, supra note 220, at 23. See also Chandler, The Adversaries, in PUBLIC POLICY
AND PRIVATE ENTERPRISE, HARV. BUS. REV. 5 (Special Reprint 1983).
In the United States, business hierarchies appeared before public ones. In Europe,
the reverse was true. When the large government bureaucracies did appear in this
country, the basic adversarial role of government toward business had already
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By enacting a broad and deep array of regulations covering all areas
of waste management, the United States has established the most
comprehensive waste regulatory system in the world. Yet, at the
same time, these regulations have choked the market's ability to
function properly and respond to the waste disposal problem.
In order to reverse this over-regulation of the market economy,
the United States must realize that environmental protection does
not always mean shackling industry with numerous regulations and
sanctions. "The American system is particularly responsive to incen-
tives. Up to now, the failure of public policy has been its inability to
assess the true prices and true risks of . . . alternatives [such as
waste exchanges, prevention, and conservation], and its consequent
inability to measure against them costs of incentives .... ,,234 Al-
tering the price structure to benefit recycled products and waste
materials is a positive step, but is susceptible to price shocks and
inflation. Furthermore, although price incentives and restructuring
is an efficient method to improve market performance, it may not be
equitable. Thus, public policy must correct market imperfections by
taking into account the social costs of waste recycling and
recovery. 235
Consequently, a more cooperative relationship between the
federal government and the states, and between governments and
industry, is required.236 Cooperation is needed to give clear and con-
sistent signals about a pricing system for recovered waste as well as
general regulations on waste exchanges. 237 Simply, the United States
been defined; that definition had developed largely as a response of an influential
segment of the business community to the rise of modem big business.
Id at 9. Chandler also explains that in the 1960's and 1970's, "the standard American re-
sponse to complex economic problems [e.g., pollution) was to pass laws creating regulatory
commissions to monitor the activities of the business involved." Id. at 7.
234. Yergin, supra note 221, at 235. See also Skinner, Facing the Chemical Waste Dispo-
sal. The Newco Administrative Proceeding, 9 CAP. U.L. REV. 547 (1980). "Clearly, new types
of facilities, criteria, and professional attitudes are needed to dispose of hazardous waste
properly." Id at 565.
235. Id at 235-36. See also S. SCHURR, ENERGY IN AMEICA'S FUTURE: THE CHOICES
BEFORE Us 460-65 (1979) (a good discussion of equity and energy policy).
236. Yergin, supra note 221. In order to combat the increasing disparity between the
various governmental and industrial approaches to waste management, it is vitally necessary
to harmonize and coordinate scientific, technical and administrative efforts. This is an area
where politics should be irrelevant, where economic problems can be shared and where,
above all, common sense should prevail. Scannel, supra note 87, at 25. In Denmark, France
and West Germany, for example, the government has subsidized and helped establish ad-
vanced waste treatment plants. See L.A. Times, supra note 4, at cols. 1-2.
237. Yergin, supra note 221, at 236. See also Fox, Breaking the Regulatory Deadlock, in
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must learn to distinguish between a "caricature of a totalitarian
planned market economy and the realities of well designed govern-
ment policies that promote market forces rather than supplant
them."
238
Waste exchanges can be successfully established by either the
government or industry, as demonstrated in California and West
Germany. But whatever the entity that creates the waste exchange,
it must be able to cooperate with other market participants-
whether they be the government, industry or consumers. The EC
experience in waste management proves that well-defined laws can
guide the activities of all economic participants toward a common
societal goal. The challenge to the EC and the United States is
whether such a government-business structure can maintain the pro-
tections afforded by government regulation while allowing market
forces to reach maximum efficiency. Finally, the rationalization of
the socio-economic environment coupled with the formation of
waste exchanges is not advocacy of more government involvement,
PUBLIC POLICY AND PRIVATE ENTERPRISE, HARV, Bus. REV. 55 (Special Reprint 1983) (an
excellent analysis of the institutional conflict in the United States between government, in-
dustry, labor and special interest groups that prevents the development of consensual prob-
lem solving). Fox states that:
U.S. business is by now familiar with the dominant European and Japanese ap-
proach-a partnership, or at least close cooperation between business and govern-
ment. These partnerships often include, besides business and government,
representatives of labor and special interest groups who work to resolve problems
and to build a consensus on industry rules and standards in such areas as health,
safety, and environmental protection.
Id at 57. Fox also asserts that government should be the "final arbiter of the rule or stan-
dard" which all partnership participants obey, but that industry, labor and special interest
groups are responsible for identifying the problems and interpreting relevant data. Id at 6 1.
238. See, e.g., R. REICH, THE NEXT AMERICAN FRONTIER 133-38, 234 (1983) (discusses
the advantages of flexible productive and administrative systems that also include some na-
tional planning); and J. GALBRAITH, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE 363-64 (1971). Galbraith
asserts that:
In some places market responses still serve. Over a very large area such responses
cannot be relied upon. The market must give way to more or less comprehensive
planning of demand and supply. Here, if the industrial system does not plan, per-
formance will be poor and perhaps appalling. . . . To rely on the market where
planning is in fact required is to invite serious trouble.
Id Just as the modern business enterprise appeared as a result of an increasing volume of
economic activity that made administrative coordination of production, costs and markets
more profitable than market coordination, the government and industry ought to join efforts
to create waste exchanges that act as administrative coordinators of the waste materials mar-
ket. A. CHANDLER, THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN
BUSINESS 8 (1977) (discusses how modern business enterprises took over the functions of
coordinating flows of goods through existing processes and channels of production and dis-
tribution, and of allocating funds and personnel for future production and distribution).
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but smarter government involvement in the market economy. This
enlightened approach enables the market economy to realize its po-
tential to correct the problems it has created.
Robert N. Kwong
